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Bathsheba's Dilemma: Defining, Discovering, 
and Defending Anglo-American 
Feminist Theories of Rhetoric(s)* 
Krista Ratclifle 
"! have the fu/ings of a woman," says Bathsheba {Everdene} in Far from the Madding 
Crowd, "but 1 have on/y the /anguage of mm." 
-Virginia Woolf, "Men and Women" 
For centuries, Bathsheba's dilemma has troubled women differently in their daily lives, af-
fecting rheir lisrening and speaking as well as rhei r reading and writing. 1 But chis dilemma 
need not be read as suggesting rhat women and men literally speak differenr languages. 
Rather, it may be read as exposing, first, rhat Woman and Man occupy different relation-
ships ro language wichin the symbolic and, second, rhar each woman occupies a particu-
lar subject position wirhin che symbolic, depending on her ever changing inrersecrions of 
gender, race, class, sexual orienrarion, hisrory, narionaliry, culture, and so on.2 Barhsheba's 
dilem'ma is no r acknowledged in trad icional theories of rheroric; instead, they perpetuare, 
a mong orher things, a tradition of gender-blindness. Consider Ken neth Burke's A Rhetoric of 
Motives. To demonstrate rhat the range of rheroric includes poerics, Burke invokes Milron's 
Samson who is "enraged wirh himselffor having 'divulged 1 The secret gifr ofGod ro a de-
ceitful 1 Woman'" (3). By analyzing Samson's rherorica l siruation only in rerms of Samson's 
suffering and violence, Burke leaves readers wondering whether che range of rheroric in-
eludes rhe unnamed bur ever presenr Delilah. Feminisr challenges ro the rherorical rraditions 
are presently emerging ro address such genderblindness with che hope of recognizing, validat-
ing, and addressing Barhsheba's dilemma. 
Alrhough feminist challenges have carved out spaces for rhemselves within rheroric 
and composirion ci rcles, rhey hardly presume theoretical consensus. Indeed, they define 
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Barhsheba's dilemma d ifferenrly.3 Sorne fem inisr challenges srudy women 's construcrion of 
knowledge claims (e.g., Mary Field Belenky, Elizaberh Flynn, Carol G illigan, Jane Tedesco); 
others study women's textual srrategies (e.g., Pamela Caughie, Mary P Hiatt, bell hooks); 
o rhers srudy how rhetorica l rheories posirion women and Woman (e.g., Linda Brod key, 
M argaret Fell, Susa n Jarran , And rea Lunsford a nd Lisa Ede); orhers srudy rheto rica l theo-
ries rhat women themselves ha ve consrrucred (e.g., C heryl Glenn, Ba rbara Jo hnson, C . Jan 
Swearingen); still orhers srudy intersecrio ns of rhetorical theory and pedagogy (e.g., Florence 
Howe, Susan O sborn, Marjorie C urry W oods); o r as Virginia Wool f cla ims about women 
and lirerarure in A Room of One's Own, rhey may srudy sorne combination thereof (3). 
Many feminisr cha llenges ro rhe rhetorical tradirions draw from srudies in other disci-
plines, interrogaring their cla ims, merhodologies, a nd assumprions in arder ro determine 
their imp licatio ns for rhe hisrory, theory, and pedagogy o f rheroric and composirion srudies 
(H orner 206). An imporrant implicarion thar emerges concerns merhodology. Like femin isr 
challenges to litera ry, historical, and philosoph ical tradirions, fem inist cha llenges to rhe rhe-
rorical rradirio ns may employ a variery o f interwoven moves: (1) recovering, (2) rereading, 
(3) exrrapolaring, and (4) conceprualizing.5 
Recovering involves rhe archaeological projecr of discovering lost o r m arginalized theo-
ries of rhetoric. Because Cary Nelson's rhree axioms for recovering lite ra ry texts provide a 
means no r only fo r expanding cano ns but also for cririquing rhe crireria by which canons are 
construcred, rhey could easily be adopred for rhe to ric and composirio n projects: (l) retain 
rexrs rhar were popular or influenrial in particula r periods, such as Ida B. Wells' speeches, a 
move rhat will reconstruct history; (2) re ra in texrs rhat people repeatedly claim are worth-
less-for insra nce, Eudora Ramsey Richa rdson's rexr on women's public speaking-a move 
rhar will conrinually force us ro c ritique o ur biases; and (3) recover writers and theorisrs, 
like Margarer Fell and Audre La rde, who have dropped out or been lefr out of rherorical 
histories, a move thar may force us o ff the page and inro cultural gaps (Recovery 51). O nce 
recovered , women's rhetorical theories may be construcred inro a separare rherorical t radi-
tio n or incorporared inro rhe exisri ng corpus of rhero rical rheories. The firsr oprion assumes 
a gynocrirical sra nce rhar emphasizes differences a mong women's rexts, as exemplif ied in 
Andrea Lunsford 's Reclaiming Rhetorica a nd Mary E llen Waithe's rwo-volume A History of 
Women Philosophers. The second oprion assumes a desegregared srance rhar purs women 's 
rheories into play "equally" wirh men's, as atrempred in Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Hen-
berg's The RhetoricaL Tradition. Although bo th options serve irnporranr functions, they each 
pose porenria l pirfalls rhar must be guarded againsr: t he first could a llow wo men's rhetori-
cal rheories ro degenerare into a separare but unequal position, and rhe second could a llow 
women's rheto rical theories ro become mere tokens. M oreover, because both methodologies 
a re based on idenri ry, borh options focus on recovering specific women a nd rheir rexrs, a 
srraregy rhar revolves a round rhe questio n W ho is speaking? and relegares unidenrified texrs 
into rhe anonymo us caregory. Barbara Biesecker propases an alrernarive m ea ns of concep-
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tualizing hiscory, arguing thar feminist histories of rheroric shóuld construcr a new narra-
tive. This new narrarive would not frame hiscories a round specific subjects as agenrs-fo r 
example, Woolf, Oaly, and Rich. lnstead , it would foreground che forces that make speak-
ing possible, such as a textual analysis of discursive positions (148). To Biesecker's claim, 
however, [ wou ld add the following quesrion: What forces, including who is (nor) speaking, 
made particular speaking subjecrs (im)possible? 
Rereading enrails revising our interprerarions of ca nonical and recovered rheories of rher-
oric. Rereading canonical rheories may not o nly reaffi rm rheir valuable conrriburio ns ro rhe-
torica l srud ies but a lso explode rheir par ria rc hal assu mptions a nd impl icarions for composi-
rion studies. Phyllis Lassner provides a n exa mple of chis latter move in her feminist rereading 
of Rogerian argumenr. Reread ing canonica l theories may give voice ro wome n's/Woman's 
si lenced concriburions, shedding lighr 0 11 rhe ir visible absences thar may be perceived as fl it-
ting presences only in prefaces, foornores, dedicarions, o r margins. Such projecrs e irher may 
foc us on real hiscorical wome11 , as in C heryl G lenn's srudy of Aspasia's ínfluence on Socrares' 
concepr of rhecoríc and Drema Lipscomb's srudy o f Sojou rner Trurh 's influe nce 011 public 
discourse, or rhey may focus o n rhe analyríc caregory of Woma n , as in Page duBoís's philo-
sophical projecr a nd Susa n Ja rrart's rherorical one (Sophists). Rereadi ng ca non íca l rheories 
may also resu lt in rhe const ruction of femin ist rheories of rheroric, as in OaJe Bauer's re read-
ing of Bakhrin 's discourse rheory (Feminist Dia!ogics). Furrhermore, rereading women's 
recovered theories and judging them by contemporary cri reria mighr uncover important 
conrributions ro rhecorical srudies, as exemplified by Bizzell and H erzberg's ínclusion of 
Sarah Grimke's defense of Anglo-America n women's public speaking and by Karlyn Kohrs 
Campbell 's inclusion of Mary C hurch Terrell 's critique of Africa n America n women's public 
spea king (Man Cannot Speak). Though no t all recovered rheories emerge from a feminist 
ideology, such rheories may be reread for feminist purposes, rhar is, ro foreground how gen-
de red claims and srraregies affect rhetorica l history, theory, and pedagogy. 
Exrrapolating entails rereading non-rhecoric texts (essays, e tiquette manuals, cookbooks, 
fict ion, diaries, etc.) as rheories of rhecoric. T hat is, rheories of rheroric may be ex trapolared 
from women's and/or femi nists' critiques of language as well as from che textua l strategies 
of such c ritiques.7 For example, Bizzell and H erzberg encourage readers ro view C hristine 
de Pisan's Treasure of the City of Ladies as borh a rheroric m a nual a nd a n etiquette book 
del ineating Renaissance women's courrly gestures; Ka rlyn Kohrs Campbell posits a gender-
rela red theory of feminine style based o n che ideas and textual straregies of ninereenth-cen-
tury feminist orators, such as Maria W. Miller Srewa rt and E lizabeth Cady Stanton (Man 
Cannot Speak); and Patricia Yaeger conceprua lizes a rheory of ema ncipacory sryle of wom-
en's writing based on rhe ideas and textual straregies in ninereenth- a nd rwent ierh-cenrury 
women's lirerarure. Given rhat few rheroric texrs by wom en have been, or are likely ro be, 
recovered and given that much of che modern and conrempora ry research and personal mus-
ings about women and language has occurred ourside the field of rhetoric a nd composition, 
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ex trapolarion may provea rich inrerdisciplina ry resource for rhetoric and composition schol-
ars who are inrerested in construcring women's and feminisr rheories of rhetoric. One point 
about this extrapolaring move should be nored, lesr an extrapolated rheory be mistaken for 
a posirivistic rendering of che nonrhetoric rexrs: as in erhnogra phic srudies, che person ex-
trapolaring rhe rheory influences rhe resulring rheory. 
Conceprualizing implies w riti ng new rheories of rheroric. The debates rhar rage abour 
this process parallel debates berween liberal and radical feminisms, rhar is, between work-
ing wirhin insrirutiona l srrucrures or overrurn ing rhese s rrucrures. Should feminisrs situare 
rheir rheories w ithin rherorica l rrad ir ions, or should we quesrio n any connection wirh such 
rrad itions? Though rhese rwo quesrions appea r sepa rare, rhey a re nor. Because we are born 
inro la nguage, we ca nnor escape rhe dominanr discourse of rhe symbolic. No space exisrs 
in which fem in isrs may stand ro begin rora lly anew, fo r Arisro rle wrires us as much as we 
may wrire (againsr) him. Bur because rhe dom ina nr discourse is nor sraric, it may be revised. 
H ence, rwo possibiliries arise. The fi rst is rhar new rherorica l rheories and pracrices may 
e merge from rhe old. Roxan ne Mounrford, however, caurio ns us about relying too heavily on 
rhe old: "appropria ring classical rherorics wirhour deeply rra nsform ing rhem from che poinr 
of view of che disadva nraged- rhose who wou ld seek ro enter sorne k ind o f public forum, 
sorne insriruriona lized discourse, wirhour rhe benefir of che elite, whire, maleness rhar classi-
ca l rheroric presumes irs srude nrs ro ha ve-is foolha rdy" ("Fem inist Theory" 2). The second 
possibiliry is rhar rhe unconceprua lized rhar-which-al ready-exisrs may be conceprualized. 
Ka rly n Kohrs Ca mpbe ll conrends rhar such projecrs wi ll radically challenge our funda-
mental assumprions abour rheroric ("Sou nd of Women's Voices" 214); bell hooks conrends 
rhar such projecrs wi ll a lso force us ro ask rhe quesrions Who is lisrening and Whar is being 
hea rd ? ("Young Soldier" 14). The potencia l of rhese rwo possible conceptualiz ing moves purs 
li bera l feminisms and radical femin isms inro play. Liberal feminisrs must recognize rhar 
particular cha nges wirhin srrucru res can change rhe srrucrures, a nd radical feminisrs must 
recogn ize rhar new srrucrures emerge from exisring ones, wherher rhar emergence is vio lenr 
or peaceful , fase or slow, conscious or unconscious. The implications of rhese conceprualiz-
ing m oves are enormous. They encou rage not a passive accepta nce of structural oppression 
bur rarher Ju lia Krisreva's "rad ica l refusal of rhe subjecrive li mirarions" of che strucru re of 
domina m discourse ("Women's Time" 20). They also rejecr the d esire for a toralizing rheory 
a nd embrace che possibiliries of mu lriple rheories rhar a rt iculare mul tiple standpoinrs a nd 
pracrices. 
A ll four moves-recovering, reread ing, exrrapolaring, conceprualizing, or sorne combi-
narion thereof-offer rremendous porenria l for Challe nging our rherorica l tradirions. Bur if 
rhe recovery of women's a nd feminisr rheories of rheroric proves as difficult as Bizzell and 
H erzberg imply (670), rhen rereading, exrrapolar ing, and conceptualizing may become c ru-
cia l research functions for rheroric and composirio n research abour Barhsheba's dilemma. 
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Focusing o n the extrapolating option, 1 offer rhe followi ng critical question for chis srudy: 
H ow may Virginia Woolf's, Mary Oa ly's, and Adrienne Rich 's Anglo-American feminist 
theories of rheroric be extrapolated fro m rheir feminisr texts about women, la nguage, and 
culture in ways that producrively complicare the genderblindness of tradi tional rhetoric and 
composirion hisrory, theory, and pedagogy? As one response ro this question, 1 exam ine the 
interrelationship between what Woolf, Oaly, and Rich write and how they write; in other 
words, 1 extrapolare their feminist theories of rheroric from their imerwoven daims and tex-
tual strategies. 1 offer these extrapolated rheories nor as positivistic rrurhs lying just under 
rhe surface of these feminisrs' texts, not as rhe final words on feminism a nd rheroric and 
composition studies, and cerrain ly not as roralizing visions that speak ro and for all women . 
Rather, 1 offer these extrapolated theories as my readings of three women's texts, readings 
that inform my rheroric and composition studies every time I sir down ro write or walk into 
a classroom. 1 hope this study comributes ro the cominuing conversarions abour feminisms 
and che rhetorical traditions by inviti ng readers not only ro question how Woman, women, 
and feminists have been locared as a pa rt of, and apart from, rhese traditions but also ro ex-
plore the implications of such locations for rhetorical histo ry, rheory, and pedagogy. 
T his chapter [ ... discusses] how Anglo-American fem inisr rheories o f rheroric may be 
defined, discovered, and defended . The defining section establishes the theoretical perspec-
t ive of this study and defines A nglo-American feminist theories of rheroric. T he discover-
ing section rereads Roland Barthes's essay "The O ld Rhetoric: An Aide-M émoire" to locate 
gaps in che received rradition rhat Woolf's, O aly's, and Rich 's rheories mighr fill or expand. 
Finally, the defending section argues that rhese rhree rheories do indeed provide importam 
Anglo-American feminist challenges to rhe rherorical rraditions. 
0EFINI NG ANGLO-AM ERICAN FEMIN IST THEORIES OF RH ETORic(s) 
My project, with its focus on A nglo-American feminist theories of rhetoric, offers multiple 
readings and , as such, demands defini t ions.9 M y use of the rerm ftminist refers ro a mare-
rialisr feminism rhar can be posicioned, in parr, in relation ro rhe following rerms: ftmale 
is defined as characreristics grounded in biological sex differences, ftminine as behaviors 
grounded in socially construcred gender differences, women as nonessemialist real-Ji fe his-
rorical subjects, Woman as an analytic caregory, a nd ftminist as an erhical srance rhar fore-
grounds sexual and gender concerns as a part icularly producrive means of demystifying 
and cririquing the cultural marrix-including rhe complexiries of gender, race, class, sexual 
oriemation; religious preference, geographicallocation, and so on, wirhin which power rela-
rions function. 
A marerialisr-feminist stance cites language as an importam arena of political struggle 
bur is skept ical of isolaring language a nd abstracrions from orher arenas of struggle (Newron 
and Rosen felr xxi). Such a srance locates feminism as a site of inquiry from which arise possi-
bil ities for (re)visioning multiple concerns wirhin a specific culture. Moreover, this feminist 
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revisioning is nor passive. lt emails (re)writing the pasr and rhe presem, nor ro ignore the 
roles of men bur ro draw attention to gendered acrions, biases, and assumptions as well as 
rhe accompanying inequities of power. Since men's roles have usually been the primary focus 
in history, since men rhernselves have usually been rhe prirnary imerpreters of their roles in 
history, and since che consrrucrion of rhese "faces" occurs within discourse, an interroga-
tion of language rhat exposes rhe constructed "narure" of ideology becomes crucial ro rhe 
marerialist feminisr projecr of revision. Through rhis feminist revisioning, polirical srances 
are translared into action so rhar personal and collective change is not only imagined but ef-
fecred. And rhis imagining a nd effecting are what introduce rhe space of rhetoric as well as 
rhe need for feminist theories of rhetoric. 
The materialist feminism of chis srudy is complicared, however, by che rerm AngÚJ-Amer-
ican. Even though Woolf is Protestanr, Daly is "Nag-Gnostic," and Rich is Jewish, 1 situ-
are rhese women wirhin feminist tradition(s) rhar Toril Moi names Anglo-American. This 
classificarion implies a materialist feminism possessed of rhe ethical stance described above; 
ir also impl ies a feminism admittedly siruated in che whire privilege of British and Norrh 
American rraditions. Siruared in relation ro African American feminist rradition(s), Carib-
bean American ones, Narive American ones, French ones, and so on, rhe whire privilege 
rhar is particularly located wichin rhe Anglo-American feminisr tradition(s) raises certain 
questions, particularly quescions of definirion relating ro che terms women and Woman. The 
problematics of rhese deflnitions are well articulated by bell hooks: 
H istorically, whire pauiarchs rarely referred ro rhe racial identity of white 
women because rhey believed rhac che subject of race was political and there-
fore would contaminare the sancrifled domain of "whire" woman's realiry. 
By verbally denying white women racial identity, that is by simply referring 
ro rhem as women when whar rhey meant was white women, their status was 
further reduced ro that of a non-person .... 
White feminisrs did not challenge che racisr-sexisr rendency ro use che 
word "woman" ro refer solely ro white women; rhey supported it. For rhem 
ir served two purposes. Firsr, it allowed .rhem ro proclaim white men world 
oppressors while making ir appear linguistically rhat no alliance existed be-
tween white women and whire men based on shared racial imperialism. Sec-
ond, ir m acle possible for white women ro actas if alliances did exist berween 
themselves and non-white women in our society, and by doing so they could 
deflect attention away from rheir classism and racism. ("Race and Feminism" 
140) 
Jackie Jones Royster offers one solution ro chis problem: we muse na me everybody before we 
can srop naming anyone. 
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Considering hooks's critique and Royster's solurion, [ na me my srudy Angkl-American so 
as ro respecr che differences among feminisrs in genera l and ro stipulare my focus on Anglo-
American feminist theories of rhetoric in particula r. For as Judith Levine has claimed in 
"Whire Like Me," Anglo-American feminists have an eth ical imperative ro deal wirh race at 
rhis particula r hisrorical momenr, to move beyond discussing race mosdy, or only, in rerms 
of "rhe Other" (23). Such a move ex poses what many people wirh white privilege ofren for-
get: that race is marked on Anglo-American women as well as on African American women 
or Native American women or C hicana women, and rhat particular diffe rences exisr within 
each of these caregories.[ . . . ] Thus, as Toni Morrison has encouraged literary rheorists todo 
(Playing6), I attempt ro articulare how rhe silences whispers, images, and argumenrs abour 
race have contributed ro rhe presence of rhe Anglo-American idenrities w irhin Woolf's Da-
ly's, and Rich 's rheories.12 [ .•• ] 
Despite our culture's powerful soc ializing tend ency ro define ftminist as man-harer, my 
tide's emphasis on chalfenges is, first of a ll , nor a separacisr move. 1 do not deny rhe effec-
tiveness of men's rherorical rheories, wherher rhey be those of Arisrorle, Augusrine, Burke, 
Roland Barches, or Henry Louis Gares. 1 believe, for instance, rhat Arisrotelian rherorical 
rheory is so pervasive in our cu lture rhar iris inscribed o n and in our bodies and rhat, con-
sequenrly, we should undersrand it a nd use ir for our own ends. Yet we musr also be honest 
abour irs limitations: for exa mple, irs genderblind ness. My emphasis on challenges is, second 
of a ll, nota nurturing move, which may seem stra nge, perhaps not supportive enough, fo r 
sorne feminists and nonfeminists a like. Bur my goal is ro confronr conflic ts while respect-
ing my readers and srudents, no r ro c reare a "safe space" in rheory o r in pedagogy. Fo r even 
rhough safe spaces seemingly provide remporary ha rbors from a violenr world, rhey usua lly 
ex ist only in rhe scholar/reacher's mind. lndeed, such spaces roo often deny che very real 
conflicrs inside and ourside our minds and , more importand y for our srudents, inside and 
outside our classrooms. Susan Ja rratt articulares this srance pa rricularly well: "[M]y hopes 
a re pinned on [a theoretical conversarion and] a composirion course ... in which srudenrs 
argue about the erhical implicarions of discourse on a wide range o f subjecrs and, in doi ng 
so, cometo idenrify rheir personal inreresrs w ith others, undersrand rhose inte reses as impli-
cated in a la rger communal setting, and advance rhem in a public voice" ("Feminism and 
Composition" 121). 
The term rhetoríc thar 1 employ in chis book problematizes Kenneth Burke's concept, 
which merges " its use of identiflcation and irs nature as ttddressed" (Rhetoric of Motives 45). 
As Burke himself claims, chis rhetorical function pervades a ll aspects of culture: "We can 
place in ierms of rheroric a ll rhose sraremenrs by anrhropologisrs, erhnologists, individua l 
and social psychologists, and che like, rha t bea r u pon che persuasive aspects of language, che 
function of language as addressed, as director roundabout appea l ro rea l or ideal audiences, 
wirhout or wirhin" (44). This definition posits rheroric as a conscious and unconscious so-
cializing function of language through which specific subjects, conrexts, and rexrs inreract 
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ro conscruct meanings thar influence public a nd privare cultural spaces by moving specific 
subjecrs ro personal and collecrive accion and /or arritude (50). Such a concept of rhetoric 
and rherorical analysis exposes rhe funcrion of ideology in rhe inrerwoven textual, personal, 
and cultura l and reminds us that rheroric has a socializing, hence moralizing, function rhat 
influences all texts and all people (39; xiv-xv). 
Yer sorne gaps in Burke's rheory (as in m a ny orher rheories of rheroric) necessirate rhe 
search for feminisr rheories of rhetoric. First, Burke's theory focuses on poinrs of idencifi-
cation more tha n points of difference. Burke predicares his concept of idenrification upon 
the ex isrence of difference and acknowledges rhar specific rerm inisric screens will rrigger 
pa rticular worldviews; howeve r, his desire is for rhetoric ro erase such differences throu gh 
consubsrancia lity and ro rhe reby e ffect the possibiliry of communicarion. H e argues rhar 
a consubsranrial move is possible because differenr k inds of symbols, including language, 
promore s imila rities through social ization (Lnnguage as Symbolic Action 52). Bur much is 
rendered invisible when ide nri fication becomes rhe ma in rherorical pursuir. Second, Burke's 
rheory perpetuares a cenruries-long rrad ition of genderblindness. Like many orher rheories 
of rheroric , no menrion is made of rhe differences in men's a nd women's cultura l positions; 
indeed , lirrle menrio n is mad e of wornen excepr in the "Courtship" secrion of A Rhetoric of 
Motives (208). So deeply enrre nched in rhe do minanr ideology a re such sex and gender biases 
a nd erasures rhar rhey appea r as rhe natural o rder of rhings, nor as subjec rs for investigarion. 
Alrhough women a nd feminisrs should nor rejecr Burke's rheory or a ny orher pha llogocen-
rric rheories solely because of such biases or erasures, we do need ro expose racir assumprions 
abour sex a nd gender and a na lyze rheir implica rions. 
To complicare rhese gaps in Burke's rhetorica l fun crion, 1 call on rhe rheories of Roland 
Barrhes and Julia Krisreva. Because 13urke's te nsio n berween idenrification and differe nce 
assumes binary srrucrura l bo unda ries rhar li mir rhe potenrial p lay of language and, hence, 
potencial meanings, 1 invoke Barrhes's rheory of language function ro complicare Burke's 
rheory. Ba rrhes posirs langu age as a sign system rhat presumes rhe potentially endless play 
of rhe signifier, rhar is, a sign ifying process in which signifiers become mulriple signifieds 
rhat in rurn becorne other s ig nifiers. T his la n g uage function as rransformation becomes a 
game for Barthes, "the very pleasure of power," the cultural site where various voices inrer-
secr ro consrruc r "rhe pensive rext" (S/Z 59, 217). Despire concerns of cerrain feminist crirics, 
Ba rrhes's play need nor erase rhe ideological na tu re of language bur may instead foreground 
ir by merging quesrions of rhe personal (idiolectal forms) and rhe political (collecrive for-
mulas) with rhe porenr ial for revision (memory) ("Sryle and lts lmage" 98-99). As such, 
Ba rrhes's d oubling of mulripliciry and ideology rrtay be read as posirjng a language function 
rhar quesrions socialization as idenrifica rion a nd celebrares socializa don as perpetuarion of 
difference. By purcing the possibilities of Burke's rherorical function in play with Roland 
Barthes's language function, 1 imagine a rheto rical funcrion rhat offers possibiliries of dif-
ference, nor just identification, and thar assumes multiple inrerprerive possibilities thar, in 
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mrn, consrrucr spaces for feminisr revisionings. This resulring rhetorical function resembles 
rhe particle/wave rheory of lighr in quantum physics: that is, a person's stance, like an elec-
rron's position, can be noted, or rhe conti nua! play of rhe signifler, like an elecrron's motion, 
can be noted; however, like posirion and morion, srance and play cannot be observed simul-
taneously. 
To confronr rhe implicarions of genderblindness in rhis rhetorical funcrion, 1 work from 
Kristeva's rhird rerm of feminism, rhe "insertion into history and the radica l refosai of the 
subjecrive limirations imposed by rhis hisrory's time" ("Women's Time" 20). From this 
standpoint, many possibilities emerge. Firsr, Krisreva's third rerm enables feminists to refuse 
the violent metaphors of killing and scapegoating upon wh ich Burke's rherorical theory is 
based (Rhetoric of Motirm 13; Language as Symbolic Action 55). Second, ir enables fe mi nisrs ro 
refuse rhe binary trap of being forced to idenrify eirher wirh Lakofrs colo r conscious women 
or with Cixous's hysrerical Medusa (Ryder 531)16; indeed, women can use the language of 
men ro express rhe feelings of women. Third, ir enables femin ists to (re)lheorize rhetorical 
rheories; rhat is, conventional rheories of rhetoric may [be] viewed nor as static but as mu-
table, while new theories may be seen as emerging from the old and making the old unrec-
ognizable. Such possibilities challenge the rhetorical rraditions. 
Therefore, by complicating Burke's rhetorical fu ncrion with Barrhes's multiplicity and 
Kristeva's third term of feminism, 1 construcr a rhetorical funcrion rhat inrersecrs wirh my 
materialisr feminism. From this position, 1 consrrucr rhe following definirion: Anglo-Amer-
ican ftminist theories of rhetoric are those theories rhar employ Anglo-American materialisr 
feminism(s) as rheir primary lens of inquiry to ex pose how language functions rhrough sub-
jecrs , conrexrs, and texrs to consrrucr meanings rhar influence public and privare cultural 
spaces by moving specific subjecrs ro personal and collective acrion and/or attirude. G iven 
thar no rheory can provide a totalizing vision, Anglo-American feminisr rheories of rheroric 
a re admittedly limired; they foreground cerrai n concepts and const iruencies while back-
grounding others. What becomes visible is how, from an Anglo-American woman's perspec-
rive, la nguage affecrs and is affecred by sex and gender. Bur because sex and gender do not 
exisr in a vacuum, they emerge as a producrive means of demysrifying and critiquing power 
relarions wirhin the complex cultura l matrix. Thus, Anglo-American feminisr rheories of 
rheroric recognize, validare, and address Barhsheba's dilemma by conrexrualizing gendered 
discursive practices and by questioning rheir inrerwoven claims and srrategies as well as rheir 
assumprions and implications. 
Anglo-American feminist rheories of rheroric assu me inrerwoven relarionships of the 
personal, the textual, and the cultural. Theorizing such inte rrelarionships problemarizes the 
poststructuralisr concepr of text, which is ofren read as enveloping everyrhing and which is 
sometí mes read as negaring rhe possibiliry of political positioning. Andrea Nye articulares 
the necessity of reimagining rexr as follows: "srrucrura lisr and posr-strucruralisr rheories of 
symbolic meaning complete rhe philosophy of man [by posiri ng] a textual arena where am-
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bivalenr relations can be acced ouc, while ar rhe same time rea llife conrinues wich its murder 
and cruelties" (217). To address Nye's complainr, 1 read che personal, the textual, and che 
cultural as rherorical functions rhac have interseccing, though noc idenrical, propercies: che 
personal constructs and reflects the textual and the cultural, che textual conscruccs and re-
flects che personal and che cultural, and che cultural construcrs and reflects che personal and 
che textual. Because a ll chree caregories are defined notas sratic arti faccs but as rherorical 
functions, specific subjects assume a limiced agency, texts assume a pocenriality of mean-
ings, and cultures assume a nonstatic suucturation. A 11 are read in order ro make ideology 
visible and ro locate gaps rhat disempowered subjects may fill wich rheir heteroglossic words, 
nonunified voices, and conflictive act ions.19 
Within rh is framework, rhetorical analyses of personal, textual, and cultural functions 
a re imperative. For rexcs may emerge differently given different cultural agenr(s), space(s), 
and momenr(s). As such, texts a re not ferishized but are instead rendered subject ro conrex-
tualized (re)constructions of meanings at various cult ural sites of production and consump-
tion. Texts may disrurb personally and culrura1ly accepced ideas as wel1 as effecc personal 
and cultural transformarions. At che same time, personal and cultural evenrs may creare che 
space for specific subjects o r cultural forces ro imagine, wrire, publish, or read such cexcs. 
These inrersections of che personal, the textual, and che cultural are importanr, for they 
construct spaces wherein rhe dominant ideology may be cominually reinforced, rejected, or 
reimagined; such inrersecrions force us to recognize rhar when we question textuality, we 
also quesrion our cultures and ourselves. 
DiscovERING SEx AND GENDER GAPS IN THE RHETORICAL TRADITIONS 
Unril recencly, the rhecorical cradicion commonly evoked such names as Ariscotle, Cícero, 
Quinrilian, Augustine, Cassiodorous, Perer Ramus, Hugh Blair, George Campbell, Richard 
Whacely, l. A. Richards, and Kenneth Burke, all of whom have rheorized and/or practiced 
che art of rhetoric. The consrruccion of such a tradicion, impressive as it is, has reinforced two 
trends: a dominance of phallogocentric theories and rhe marginalization of certain people. 
Recently, many rhetoric and composirion scholars have challenged one anocher ro interrogare 
che closure implied by chis construccion and ro enrertain che possibilities of multiple, diverse 
rhecorical traditions rhat not only revise che canon but also question t he concept of canon 
and che assumptions of canon formacion (e.g., Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, W illiam 
Covino, Susan Jarratt, Andrea Lunsford, ) aspar Neel). In chis scudy 1 respond ro such chal-
lenges by focusing on feminist cheories of rhecoric. To' lay the groundwork for my response, in 
chis section 1 idenrify sex and gender gaps in che received Ariscorelian rherorical cradition(s) 
rhat may serve as spaces, or starting poinrs, for conceptualizing feminisr cheories of rheroric. 
Alrhough a variery ofhiscories would seemingly serve my purpose, 1 will (re)read Roland 
Banhes's essay "The O ld Rhetoric," compiled in 1964- 65 when he became inreresced in 
che ninereenth-century "dearh " of che old rhecoric. Barthes's rwentierh-cenrury reception 
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of rherorical history and rheory is heavily Aristorelian, which is appropriate for my purpose 
here, given rhat Arisrode's Rhetoric remains a domina m thread in rwenrierh-century "recov-
eries" of rheroric. "The Old Rheroric" not so much reconscrucrs a linear hisrory as narrares 
moments of rhe old rheroric, questioning tradicio nal rhetorical conceprs in rerms of class 
and srructuralist language assumptio ns. For scho la rs who want ro complicare t radicional 
rhetorical conceprs in terms o f gender, rhe importance of Barthes's critique is rwo-fold: ir 
not only models a critica ) merhodology, using class as a crirerion , but ir also funccions as a 
hisrory rexr rhar may be reread for its own gender gaps. In rhe following paragraphs 1 com-
plicare Barrhes's reading of rhe o ld rheroric in rerms of gender gaps; in particular, 1 examine 
definitions o f rhetoric in terms of (1) proofs and appeals, (2) language function, (3) rext and 
rhe five rhetorical canons, (4) author and audience, (5) rherorica l situation, (6) hisrory, tradi-
rions, canons, (7) politics, and (8) pedagogy. 
The reason for such a rereading is simple: 1 want ro idenrify rhe possibilities and limira-
tions of rhis Arisrorelian rherorical rheory for women and feminisrs. Like orher rwenrierh-
cenrury receptions, Barthes's rendering explores rhe possibiliries of rhis rherorical rheory, 
rhat is, irs potencial for empowering anyone in any situation ro achieve any end. What is not 
recognized, however, is its limitat ions for outsiders. Women occupy different cultural spaces 
than men, and feminists occupy different cultural spaces rhan nonfeminisrs. Alrhough in-
finite possibiliries abound for particular differences wirhin rhese various cultural spaces, 
identifying rhe limitatio ns of the old rheroric for rhese cultura l spaces demysrifies gendered 
power plays as well as p revalenr srereorypes (e.g., rhar women are nor as logical oras reason-
able in rheir a rgumenrs as men). By cririqui ng both rhe possibil iries and rhe lim irarions of 
Barrhes's reception of rhetorica l hisrory and rheory for women and feminists, 1 simultane-
ously discover spaces for, and highlighr rhe need for, feminisr rheories of rheroric. 
To begin such a project, Ba rrhes's definitions of rheroric m ust be exam ined. He claims 
that "rhe world is incredibly full of old Rheroric" and cites rheroric's importance as the only 
rheorerica l srrucrure rhar has foregrounded rhe funcrion of language ("The Old Rheroric" 
11, 15). Though rheroric has (re)emerged in academic circles during rhe last half of rhe 
twemieth cemury as an impo rranr sire of inquiry, the term still suffers from hazy, multi-
layered definitions and, consequendy, rerains sorne of its power for feminism(s). 21 Ba rrhes 
acknowledges such a posirion when he defines rhetoric as a meta langauge and deli neares its 
six differenr, though somerimes simulraneous, func tions: (1) a technique or arr, (2) a reach-
ing, (3) a science, (4) an erhic, (5) a socia l pracrice, a nd (6) a ludie pracrice (13- 14). Barthes's 
mulciple definirions ca n be read and quesrioned so as ro invite women and feminisrs inro 
the Burkean parlor. 
Barrhes's rheroric as technique is defined asa n " 'arr' in rhe classical sense of the word; 
rhe arr of persuasion, a body of rules and recipes whose implemenration ma kes ir possible 
ro convince the hearer of rhe d iscourse ... , even if whar he is ro be convinced of is ' false' " 
("The O ld Rheroric" 13). For Barrhes, rheroric as techne implies a form /conrenr splir, despire 
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ocher rhecoricians' claims ca che comrary (Corbett 381). Thac is, Barthes's rhetoric as techne 
reveals how rhecoric as an " ideology of form" may be learned and employed by anyone in 
any discourse situation. While che possibilities for empowerment within such a scruccure are 
righdy emphasiz.ed, we too afeen forget to question che limitations of this theorecical scance. 
Parcicularly, we myscify che fact chat different speakers and wricers occupy differem cultural 
posicions and, hence, different posicions of power. By asserring a false sense of equality (i.e., 
thac everyone can learn and employ and be empowered by rhecorical conventions), we as-
sume thac che logic underlying rhis strucrure is a universal logic shared by all people in all 
cultures ac all points in history, rhac specific agency alone can overcome struccural oppres-
sions, and that content is separated from form. Feminist theories of rhetoric should not only 
foreground such assumpcions but also quescion chem, problematiz.ing rhetoric asan ideology 
of form in cerms of Barthes's ocher defining cacegories of rhetoric. 
Barrhes's rhetoric as ethic is posiced as "a syscem of 'rules,' ... at once a manual of red-
pes, inspired by a prac tica! goal, and a Code, a body of ethical prescriptions whose role is 
ro supervise (i.e., to permir and to limit) rhe 'deviations' of emotive language" {"The Old 
Rhetoric" 13). This ethic poims to che cultura l constructio n of rhetorical/echical intersec-
tions, and che specific intersections conscructed provide boundaries wichin which people 
assume they can function comfortably, char is, prescriptively and predictably. In chis way, 
Barthes's rheroric as echic ex poses che inte rwoven relation of cheory and praxis. Yec chis erhic 
a lso functions from assumptions thac limic rhe rherorical potencial of women and feminists, 
as evidenced by che following questions that may inform feminist theories of rhecoric: Who 
escablishes chis erhic? What truch condicio ns muse be accepted for one to believe chis ethic? 
Who benefits from che power structure of chis echic, and how? Where are che boundaries of 
chis ethic? At what points are rhese boundaries visible and vulnerable? Whac are che impl i-
cations of believing in plain and emotive languages? And how can " 'deviations' of emotive 
language" be recovered or reread for feminist purposes? 
Barthes's rhetoric as social practice is defined as "chat privileged technique (since one 
muse pay in order to acquire it) which permics che ruling class to gain ownership ofspeech" 
("The Old Rheroric" 13-14). This social funccion exposes class assumptions that control 
subjects' relative access to rhecoric. Ir also exposes che constructed "nature" of power rela-
tions berween subjeccs wichin specified cultural spaces; as such, it implies that conscrucced 
subjectivicies, as opposed ro essenrial narures, may be deconstrucced. At che same time, chis 
social function works from assumptions chac limit rhe rhewrical pocenrial of women and 
feminists, as evidenced by the following quesrions rhar should inform fem inisc theories of 
rhewric: Whac happens to gender when class is rh~ predominant cut made across che social? 
Whac happens when che macrix of che socia l is problematiz.ed by sex and gender as a means 
of incerrogaring class, race, sexual orientation , religious preference, geography, and so on? 
How does rhetoric funcrion ourside rhe "ruling class," outside racial barriers, oucside geo-
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graphical circles, and rhe like? Where do such questions overlap? And, finally, what are rhe 
assumptions and implications ofbelieving in rhe "ownership ofspeech"? 
Barrhes's rheto ric as ludie pracrice is posed as "games, pa rodies, eroric or obscene allu-
sio ns, classroom jokes, a whole schoolboy pracrice" ("The O ld Rheroric" 14). Rhetoric as 
ludie p rovides an iro nically effecrive space for diversion and subversion. Given femi nist con-
rexts, rheroric as ludie provides feminists enrrées inro dia logues about rheto ric. As wirh Cix-
ous's laughing Medusa, the play of the ludie becomes rhe space and rhe means for feminisrs 
to identify, disrupt, and reject the logic o f phallogocentric discourse. These disruptions and 
rejecrions subvert the dominant ideology by crearing gaps rhat may be fi lled and expanded 
w irh feminists' voices, acrions, a nd theories of rhetoric. What should not be forgotten is that 
negative materia l consequences for laughrer exist, namely, madness and sometimes death. 
Yer the ludie also provides a much-needed emphasis in feminisr rheory, an emphasis on the 
pleasures that women find wi th(in) lang uage. Borrowing a metaphor from Mary O liver, 
Patricia Yaeger provides one such exa mple: "rhe a rchetype of rhe writer as a honey-mad 
woman , as someone hungry for rhe honey of speech " (4). 
Barrhes grounds his multileveled defin it ions of rhe old rheroric prima rily in Aristotel ian 
theory: "[lt] is above a ll a rheto ric of proof. of reasoning, of rhe approximative syllogism 
(enrhymeme); ir is a deliberately diminished logic, one adapted to rhe leve! o f the 'public,' 
i.e., of common sense, of ordinary opinion . ... [l)r would be well suired ro rhe produces 
of our so-called mass culture, in which an Aristotelia n 'probabiliry' prevails, i.e., 'what rhe 
public believes possible.' How many films, pulp novels, commercial a rticles might take as 
rheir motto rhe Aristotelian rule: ' be rrer an impossible probabiliry rhan a n improbable pos-
sibility' " ("The O ld Rhetoric" 22). Like W il liam Grima ld i's inrerpretation of Aristotelian 
rheroric, Barthes's Aristotelian "rhetoric o f proof' focuses on deductive a nd inducrive argu-
menrs wirh inrerwoven logical, emocional, and erhical appea ls. As scholars too nu merous 
ro nam.e have claimed, Arisrotle's bri lliantly conceived systematic arr of rhetoric has grearly 
influenced Western culture. Ver, to re ite rare rhe po int, A risrotle's rhetor ic a lso poses poten-
tia ! pitfa lls for women and feminists a nd, hence, suggesrs many possible starting points fo r 
revisionist theo ries. 
Barrhes's Aristotelian rheroric of proof presumes a deductive logic based on induct ive 
precedent, namely, thar which has comfortably come befa re. To combar this deeply in-
grained impulse, feminisrs must frequently refute received trad irions as well as recover losr 
ones and consrruct new ones, a ll in an attempt ro consrruct a space from which to speak 
effecrively. O nly when such a space is consrrucred may rhey add ress their immediate argu-
menrs and conclusio ns. Based o n Aristo rle's emhymeme as defined in his Rhetoric and Prior 
Analytics, Barrhes's rhetoric of proof a lso presumes the imporrance of a d educrive logic rhat 
relies on publicly accepted (and imagined) probable premises that lead to p robable conclu-
sions.22 
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Feminists frequendy face particular problems w ith rhe logical appeal of Barrhes's Aris-
cotelian enthymeme: specifically, che logic of thei r probable premises often does noc reflecc 
the common sense logic of che general public; therefore, che public cannot imagine or will 
noc supply missing premises. As a resu lr, feminiscs a re ofren obliged ro layout their prem-
ises and argue rheir validiry. This time-consuming process often delays political acrion. Yec 
even when their premises are ourl ined, thei r argumems and conclusions muse scill confront 
che judgmem of mass logic. And chis mass logic ofren denies che validity of personal experi-
ence, especially rhe personal experi ence~ of women, feminists, and other outsiders, unless of 
course chis personal experience ca n be validated, preferably by che testimony of cwo men.23 
Feminists also confront particular problems with Barthes's Aristotelian emocional ap-
peal. That is, these appeals are largely negared by rhe logic ofBarthes's probable/possible dis-
tinctions. The maxim-"'better, an impossible probability than an improbable possibiliry' 
"-does not provide space for many feminists' argumems ("The O ld Rhetoric" 22). Grounded 
in women's privace/public experiences and skeptical of major/minor distinctions, femin ists' 
arguments frequendy emerge as emocional pleas that are roo often received neither as prob-
able impossibilities nor as improbable possibilities but as improbable impossibilities-that is, 
improbable within che consensus of public opinion and impossible within the logic of domi-
nant discourse. That these improbable impossibilities (read "privare emocional pleas") mighr 
possess logics of rheir own is an unpopular notion rhar public opinion is not ofren willing ro 
acknowledge, ler alone explore. Jane Tompkins claims rhat Wesrern episremology allows no 
space for the emocional (170), but rhe emocional does not simply vanish. Whar Wesrern episte-
mology does is mysrify rhe power of che emocional by hiding ir in the negarive and renaming ir 
illogical, irracional, nonsensical, unrrue, invalid- all of which occupy space. As a resulr, emo-
cional appeals are rendered as improbable impossibilities. Because their logic does not neady 
fir che domina m logic of che masses, feminists are ofren labelled "mad" or "angry," accused of 
giving way ro emocional tirades, and dismissed as having no sense of humor. Such labels and 
accusations deny che validity and importance of feminists' different emocional appeals. 
Barthes's Aristotelian ethical appeal also poses problems for feminists. Arisrorle resrrict-
ed his concept of !thos ro char sense of che speaker which emerges from che rext ar rhe site 
of che audience's listening. This concepr of echos, however, has rraditionally not included 
a space for women whose sex is visibly marked on rheir bodies. The sighr of women or rhe 
sound of fem inisrs behind che bar or in che pulpic has almost always evoked resistance before 
rhey could ever utter a word, or The Word. Such resisrance calls not only upon public opio-
ion but also upon che Law (of God, of che Phallus). P~pularly invoked as transcendem Trurh 
that emerges transparendy through language, the Law is frequenrly perceived as impervious 
ro che influences of history and culture. So women a nd feminists ha ve tradirionally had ro 
argue for their right ro speak or write in a public forum abour privare and public concerns 
(e.g., Margery Kempe, Laura Cerera, Margaret Fell, Angelina and Sarah Grimke, Sojourner 
Truth, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Mary Church Terrell). Alrhough Cícero expanded Arisco-
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de's concept of ethos ro include che repucarion of rhe speaker (De Oratore 2.43), his rheory 
furrher marginalized wom en a nd feminists who were not a llowed a respectable public repu-
tatio n . 
C learly, if feminists' enrhy memic prem ises are noc imagined or supplied by che public, 
if rheir logica l appeals prolong polirica l action, if rheir em ociona l appeals a re hidden within 
che negarive, and if rheir erhical appeals are given relatively lirrle cu ltural space, rhen re-
visionisr feminisc theories of rhecoric need ro reconcepcual ize these classical boundaries of 
proof and appeal ro emancipare women from their "old" and " new" rhetarical double binds. 
T n addicion ro cririquing definitions, proofs, and appeals of rhe old rhetaric, Ba rrhes nar-
rares another impo rranr rherorical considerarion, language funcrion: 
[T]he art of speech is origina lly lin ked ro a claim of ownership, as if lan-
guage, as o bjecr of a rransfo rmation , cond irion of a pracrice, had been de-
rermined not from a subtle ideological mediario n (as may have been rhe 
case in so many form s of arr), bur from rhe baldesr socia liry, affi rmed in its 
fundamenta l brutalicy, rhar of earrhly possession : we bega n ro reflecr upon 
language in arder ro defend our own . Iris on che level of socia l conflic t rhac 
was born a firsr rheorerical sketch of fiigned speech (di fferenr frorn fictive 
speech, rhac of che poe rs: poerry was rhen rhe o nly lirerature, prose nor ac-
ceding ro rhis status unrillarer). ("The O ld Rheroric" 17) 
Pan of che "subde ideologica l rnediation" rhar musr be demyscified in rhe above descrip-
tion is rhac "we" mea nr men and "our" rneanr men's, while wome n, slaves, and ch ildren were 
relegated ro the category of"earrh ly possession" for which men bargained (Arisrod e, Politics 
1260a.7). To redefine women's posirio n, feminisc t heories of rhe roric rnusr critique chis con-
cept of language ro determine if, and how, ir can be mad e more inclusive. For how we as-
sume language functions, mo re chan anyching else, dete rmines how we read and write rhe 
cu ltural as well as che textual. When posired as a simple roo! rhar communicares rhoughc, 
language functions ar che beck and call of unified subjeccs whose unlimiced agency ca n 
dete rmine when, how, a nd why ro speak, listen, read, o r write. When posired asa n all-pow-
erfu l scrucrure rhat creares borh subjecrs a nd rhoughr, language consrrucrs discu.rsive posi-
rions within which specific subjecrs a re tora lly determined. Bur when posired as a necessary 
component of rhe torical socia lizatio n and negotiacion, la nguage becomes a means rhrough 
which specific subjecrs as rherorical agenrs borh construc t a nd re flecr their persona l and col-
lecrive texrs and cultures. The latter position allows wom en and fem iniscs the possibilicy of, 
and space .for, social change. ]use as irnporrandy, it demyscifies rhe dangers of celebraring an 
aculcural, autanomous agency, orherwise known as rhe boorstrap theory, which frequendy 
traps women and feminists inro feeling inferior, inadequare, mad, or angry for nor being 
able, singlehandedly, ro overcome sysremic sexism and its accompanying racism , classisrn, 
homophobia, religious prejudice, and so on. le a lso demysrifies certain deach-of-rhe-aurhor 
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rheories rhat have emerged jusr as women, femini srs, and orher marginalized voices were 
becoming powerful in academ ia, rheories rhat have sometimes been used ro silence rhem. 
Barrhes also na rrares che concept of rext. T h e significance of che old rheroric for che new 
rexr of modern and com emporary rhetorica l rheories is elucidaced in his opening paragraph: 
At che sou rce or on che horizon of chis seminar, as a lways, rhere was the 
modern rex t, i.e., the text which does not yet ex ist. One way ro approach chis 
new rex t is ro find out from whar poi nt of departure , and in opposicion ro 
what, ir seeks ro come inro being, and in chis way ro confrom che new se-
miorics of writing wich che classical pracrice of lirerary language, which for 
cencuries was known as Rhetoric. Whence rhe norion of a sem ina r on che 
old Rhetoric: oid does not mean rhar rhere is a new Rhetoric rod ay; rarher 
oid Rhetoric is ser in opposirio n ro rhar new which may not yer have come 
inco being: che world is inc redibly fu ll of old Rhetoric. ("The O ld R hero-
ric" 11) 
C learly che old rhetoric can not be ignored, for che new rheroric muse emerge from, or in op-
posicion ro, che old. T hus, fem inisrs may consrrucr rheories of che new rhecoric by following 
Virg inia Woolf's injunction "ro rry che accepred forms, ro discard che unfic, ro creare orhers 
which are more fittin g" ("Men and Women" 195). Woolf's third posirion echoes Barrhes's 
idea of a "rexr which does nor yer ex isr," a concepr of rexc rhar provides che perfecr opening 
for feminist cheories of rheroric. For feminisrs are concerned wirh norhing if nor arguing chac 
improbablt impossibilities are indeed possible. 
Linking the possible ro gendered rex rua li ry has implications for rerhinking rhe canons of 
rheroric, wh ich Barrhes describes as "active, tram itive, programmatic, operational," as noca 
srruc rure buc a "gradua l srruccurar io n" ("The O ld Rheroric" 50). Alrhough Barrhes reduces 
che five canons ro rhree- invemion , a rrangemenr, and sryle (51- 52)- whe n dealing with 
wrirten rexrs, fem inisr scholars should reclaim all five. Fo r feminist srudies ofinvencion, ar-
ra ngement, and sryle may help us a rticulare di fferenc rhoughr processes, logics, and shaping 
of ideas and feelin gs. Srudies o f memory m ay encourage us to ask whac is remembered, whar 
is forgonen, who makes such decisions, where, and why. And srud ies of delivery may dis-
close cultural gesrures rhar expose textual hereroglossia ar a ll sires of production (e.g. , w rir-
ing, publishing, rerailing, adverrising, reading). Hence, a ll five canons are imporranr mea ns 
of rying rhe textua l ro che persona l and che cultural, of uncovering che funccions of sex and 
gender in rhese pro cesses. 
Barrhes a lso na rrares che rherorica l conceprs of aurhor and audience by blurring rhe ir 
bou ndaries and incerweaving rhem, chus ca lling imo question che concepts of agency, iden-
tity, and unified self. When im errogatin g rhe concepr of a urhor, he distinguishes che auctor 
of rhe old rheroric from our conremporary aurhor: "As for che written cexr, ir was not subject, 
as ir is roday, toa judgmenr of origina liry; whar we call che author did not exist; a round che 
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ancient text, che only rext used and in a sense managed, like reinvesred capital, rhere were 
various functions: l . the scriptor who purely a nd simply copies; 2 . che compiiator who adds 
to what he copies, but nothing rhat comes from himself; 3. che commtntator who introduces 
himself into the copied text, bur only ro make ir intelligible; 4. the attctor, finally, who pres-
ents his own ideas but always by depending on orher aurhorities" ("The Old Rheroric" 30). 
T he ancient, agonistic auctor poses problems for feminists. He is assumed ro be a male "arh-
lete of speech" whose speech emerges as a comperition rosee who can flex rhe mosr rherori-
cal muscles. His speech " is rhe object o f a cerrain glamour and of a regulared power," and 
through chis power-play merger of grammar a nd glamour, his aggression becomes "coded" 
and invisible {30). These concepts of auctor a nd aucror's speech celebrare a vicror/victim, 
w inner/loser power dynamic based on violence rhat many feminisrs are unwilling ro accept. 
Such concepts reinforce a superior/inferior er hics rarher rha n an ethics of difference, and 
rhey denigrare personal experiences, emocions, and reasoning by rheir insisrence on "other 
aurhorities." 
lnfluenced by Enlightenment conceprs of self rhat have been srrengthened by Romamic 
nocions of privare v isions, che contemporary aurhor also poses problems for feminists. He is 
an o riginal presence, a unified self in possession of a transcendem signified. 24 This liberal 
hu manist notion of unified self presumes an autonomous agency rhat uses language as trans-
parent medium ro negociare socieral structures and rhat succeeds or fails on the basis of in-
dividual will. When trurh and ralent are perceived as foundationa l and cranscendent rather 
rhan convencional, scapegoaring emerges as a popular rherorical strategy for transferring sin, 
blame, and responsibiliry. Wirh its focus on specific subjects, chis concept of author leaves 
no space for rheorizing institucional oppressions and rhus little room for critiquing irself. 
That is, this closed concept of author does not provide feminisrs wirh spaces for questioning 
the cultural labels of women's discourse (e.g., roo personal, roo emotional) and che cultural 
value {e.g., mundane), which emerge in commonsense logics as powerful fi rst premises rhar 
are incr~asingly hard ro challenge. 
Barthes addresses che limits of aucror/aurhor concepts by repudiaring an aurhorial agen-
cy in which che aurhor's presence functions as che sale determinare of meaning ("Dearh of 
the Author"; S/Z). lnsread, he valorizes rhe continua) play of the signifier, a srance abour 
language rhat simulraneously undermines rhe concept of authorial presence as agency and 
posits a readerly agency in which che reader is i nvired ro read and read again, with each read-
ing rendering different possibiliries, different rexrs, rhar orher readers are then invited to {re) 
read. By blurring rhe caregories of aurhor and reader, Barthes argues rhat an act of writing is 
actually an aer of reading che world, oras he daims, the death of the author gives rise ro the 
birth of che reader ("Death of che Author" 55). This readerly agency rera ins a space in which 
a specific fem inist may validare her own experiences by reading/writing the world, but this 
agency does not enable her ro rotally control how orhers receive her readings/wrirings.25 This 
stance allows fem inists the possibilities of critique while acknowledging its limitacions. My 
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exrrapolarion of feminist rheories of rheroric joins chis discussion. The ideas and textual 
srraregies thar inform Woolfs, Daly's, and Rich 's fem inisr rheories o f rheto ric a re rheirs; che 
rhetorical values assigned ro rhem in my extrapolation is mine; further interprerations will 
belong to the reader. All of these processes will, of course, be influenced by our language 
and our culture. 
Barthes's concern wirh spatial and temporal influences on reading narrares another rhe-
torical concepr, rherorical situation. Barrhes questions che funcrion of space and time by 
addressing geographical dimensions of invenrive topoi: "What is a place? lt is, says Arisrotle, 
rhat in which a pluraliry of oratorical reasonings coi ncide .... Yer the metaphoric approach to 
place is more sig nificant rhan irs abstraer definition" ("The O ld Rheto ric" 64-65). Barrhes 
complicares rhe function of space with rhe movement of rime when he posirs topoi as place, 
as a merhod of findi ng arguments. Alrhough Barrhes never uses rhe term rhetorical situation, 
he does refer ro cultural "momenrs" of producrion a nd consumption thar are cominually 
being (re)constructed. Wirhin rhis comexr, Barthes's rhetorical siruation refers ro geographic 
spaces and momenrs rhar are both psychological and cultural. T his defi nition opens possi-
b iliries for constructing and validat ing fem inist revisionings; indeed, it offers more possibili-
ties for feminisrs than does Lloyd Birzer's definition of rherorical situation as the sum tota l 
of exigences, audience, and constraints. Birzer's positivistic rendering mystifies the influence 
of rime and memory, rhe consrrucrive nature of history, and, ro a degree, che multiple inter-
pretive possibilities of a rexr. Demysrifying these factors, Barthes's concept of read ing im-
plies a rhero rica l siruation, o r cultural momenr, rhat is fluid and continua lly reconsrructed . 
Barches's concept of continually reconsrrucred cultural moments narrares a closely rela t-
ed rhetorical concern, rhe compilarion of these momenrs into histories. For Ba rthes, rheto-
ric cannot be separa red from a considerar ion of history and hisroriography: "[R]hetoric ... 
ca ll [s] into question hisrory irself ... ; rhe classification ir has imposed is the only fea ture 
really shared by successive and various historical groups, as if rhere existed , superior ro ide-
ologies of conrenr a nd ro d irecr determinations ofhisro ry, an ideology ofform; as if. .. rhere 
exisred for each society a taxonomic identity, a sociologic in whose name iris possible ro de-
fine another h istory, anorher socialiry, wirhout desrroying rhose recognized a t other levels" 
("The O ld Rhetoric" 14- 15). For feminists, rhere a re borh limits and possibilit ies for change 
in studying rherorical history. Limirarions emerge in conceiving rheroric only as "a n ideol-
ogy ofform" or static structure thar has been relat ively unrouched by its cultural moments; 
such a stance may trap women into static cultural, psychological, and linguistic essential-
isms. Conceiving rheroric only as "an ideology ofform",also begs a separation of intellectual 
bodies from stylistic dress; this separation too often implies that language functions only ro 
communicare thought. Yet possibiliries fo r change do exist. Studying rhe history of rhero-
ric a llows feminists ro question che construction and importance of language theory and 
language function in textual inrerprerive processes a nd in cultural power dynam ics. Ir also 
enables rhem ro quesrion the fu ncrions of histo ries a nd h isroriographies, which in turn pro-
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mores rhe possibiliries for imagining mulriple histories and mulriple historiographies. Such 
acrions are imperarive iffeminisrs are toread and wrire rheir concerns of race, gender, class, 
sexua l orientarion, religious preference, and so on, imo history. 
For Barthes, rherorical history moves in borh diachronic and sysremaric direcrions ("The 
Old Rheroric" 15). This doubled movemem denies rhe closure of evolutionary historiog-
raphy ro which Knoblauch and Brannon consign classica l rheroric and irs poremia l appli-
carions for contemporary composirion pedagogy. This d oubled movemem also calls inro 
quesrion rhe conceprs of rradirion a nd canon. Thar is, by what crireria a re exisri ng rhetori-
ca l tradirions and canons defined? Do rhe crireria assume gynocrircal, a ndrocemric, or de-
segregared canons? W hose inre resrs do rhese crireria serve? Where shou ld feminisr rheories 
of rhetoric be located in relarion to rhese rradirions a nd to rhese cano ns? Sho uld feminisrs 
esrablish a sepa rare tradirion or expand rhe canon? What rrurh condirio ns inform differem 
rradirions, differenr canons? And whar are rhe limirs and possibilities offeminisrs' embrac-
ing rhe conceprs of rradirion and canon for rhe ir o wn projecrs of rewriting rhetorical his-
tories? The paradox of histories rha r we should always keep in mind, however, is rhar they 
have mea ning only in rhe presentas rhey inform o ur conscious and unconscious rhinking, 
acting, feeling, and being. 
W hen c rir iqu ing rhe knowledge consrrucred and dispe rsed wirhin rhese rradirions a nd 
ca no ns, Barthes narrares anorher facer of rhe old rheroric, its relarion ro polirics: "1 r is ob-
viously rempring ro confiare chis mass rhetoric wirh Arisrorle's politics; which was, as we 
know, a polirics of rhe happy medium, favoring a ba la nced democracy, cenrered on che mid-
dle classes, and responsible for reduci ng anragonisms berween rich and poor, majoriry and 
minoriry; whence a rhetoric of good sense, delibera rely subordinare ro rhe ' psychology' of 
rhe public" ("The Old Rheroric" 22- 23). Barrhes's remprarion "ro confiare chis mass rheto-
ric wirh Aristorle's politics" echoes Arisrorle's impulse ro locare rhetoric berween logic and 
erh ics_/polirics (Rhetoric 1.4. 1 O). Yer con necri ng rhetoric ro Aristorle's erh ics/pol itics m ay 
pose problems fo r fem inists. For example, Arisrode's Ideal Srares imply a bala nce, a center 
agreed upon by rnost people (read "men in power" and ''rhose men who may a rrain such 
power"). Even if such a relarively conflic r-free srare were possible, chis defi niría n erases rhe 
d ivisions berween rich and poor, free and slave, men and women; as such, ir privileges rhe 
fi rsr rerm-propertied , free, male- while presenrin g ir as rhe universal subject of rherorica l 
rheory. From a femin isr perspecrive, chis idea l srare is exposed as ideal only for rhose w irh 
power: rhe rrurhs of rhe margins are exposed as less impo rranr rhan rhe rrurhs of rhe cenrer, 
a nd rhe stress o n confl ict-free existence emerges no t simply as a desire for ha rmony bur as a 
desire for mainra in ing the Status quo. Moreover, positing a "rheroric of good sense" as rhe 
dominant discourse of A risrorelian Idea l Srares poses imporranr quesrions of power ("The 
Old Rhetoric" 23). Who gers ro defi ne good sense? Will chis good sense be construc red as 
a monoli thic caregory or as a field of di fference? Most imporrandy, why rhe emphasis on 
sense, on logic, o n rhe head ? 
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A considerarían of good sense Iocared in rhe head poinrs ro rhe final concern rhac Barthes 
narrares: pedagogy. As menrioned above, a teaching is one of Barrhes's defining caregories 
of rheroric: " [T]he arr of rheroric, iniria lly rra nsmirred by personal means (a rheror and his 
disciples, his clienrs), was soon inrroduced inro insrirurions oflearning; in schools, ir formed 
rhe essenrial marre r of whar would roday be called higher educarion; ir was rransformed inro 
materia l for examinarían (exercises, lessons, rexrs)" ("The Old Rheroric" 13). The ttaching 
names a cultura l space in which Barrhes's orher defining caregories can be raughr and chal-
lenged, yet rhe instirurionalizarion of rheroric, pa rricula rly irs relegarion ro fake exercises 
and dry handbooks, mystifies rhe potenrial of irs pe rsonal, rexrual, and cultural powers. 
Thus, rhe reach ing ra ises cerrain quesrions. Whar connections exisr berween insritutional 
a nd noninsrirurionallearning, berween rheory and praxis? Who is allowed access ro instiru-
rionallearning? Where does a srudent o r reacher srand ro cha llenge rhe dominanr rheroric? 
And whar are rhe relarions among gendered subjecrs, schools, and culture? Feminists should 
analyze rhe hisrory of rherorical pedagogy, nor j':JSt ro determine how and why wom en have 
been included or excluded bur also ro lea rn how and why pedagogical power struggles have, 
and do, undergird rhe mysri ficarions of rheto ric's porenrial for changing rhe personal, rhe 
textual, and rhe cultu ral. 
Ba rrhes concludes his essay by discussing rhe inrerwoven possibiliries of rherorical his-
ro ry, rheory, and pedagogy: "Yes, a h isrory of Rheroric (as research, as book, as reaching) is 
roday necessary, broadened by a new way of rhinki ng (linguisrics, semiology, hisrorical sci-
ence, psychoana lysis, M arxism)" ("The O ld Rheroric" 92). To rhe parentheticallisr, I wou ld 
add feminisms. For an u nderstanding of fem inist rheory and praxis would enable rheroric 
schola rs nor only ro loca te gender gaps bur al so ro imagine new texts o f rheto rical hisrory, 
rheory, and pedagogy rhat recognize, validare, and address Barhsheba's dilemma. 
D EFENDING ANGLO-AMERtCAN FEMINIST THEORIES 
oF RHETORIC(s): WooLF, D A LY, ANO RrcH 
At rhe 1992 Vi rginia Woolf Conference, Jane Marcus claimed in her closing address, "1 need 
ro make my Virginia Woolf stand for rhe issues rhar interese me." In many ways this claim 
a rticulares my own feelings abour this projecr. 1 propase ro make my Virginia Woolf, my 
Mary Daly, and my Adrienne Rich-or rarher, rhe way that 1 read rhese women's lives and 
rexrs-speak ro rhe issue rhar inreresrs me in rheroric and composirion srudies. That issue is 
femi nism, specifica lly rhe ways in which sex and gend¡::r come into play in rherorical hisrory, 
theory, and pedagogy. As one arrempt ro articu lare rhis play, 1 extrapolare WooiPs, Daly's, 
and Rich's Anglo-American fem inisr rheories of rheroric from rheir writings abour women, 
language, and culture. 
M y exrrapolarions of rhese rheories emerge from purring rhese three feminisrs' texrs into 
play wirh rhe sex and gender gaps discovered in che previous discussio n of Barrhes's essay 
"T he O ld Rheroric." Such an exrrapolarion process assumes rha r rhese feminisrs' texts are 
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genuinely concerned with rherorical concepts but rhat, because rhese feminist texrs have not 
been constructed from rhe site of rhetoric and composition studies, rheir theories of rhetoric 
must be extrapolared from rheir nonrheroric rexrs, such as rheir essays, diaries, letters, and 
poems abour women, language, and culture. The limiration of such an extrapolarían process 
is that rhe eight concepts in the preceding section may be read as a theoretical grid, which 
forces Woolf's, Daly's, and Rich 's Anglo-American feminist rheories of rheroric ro conform 
ro previous rherorical categories and, chus, erases a ny original conrriburions rhese feminisrs 
mighr make. Bur rhe possibiliry of chis exuapolation process allows another interprerarion: 
if rhese eight concepts are interpreted as interwoven functions rhat merge personal, textual, 
and culrural concerns, rhen rhey may be interpreted as sra rting points for exrrapolating 
feminist theories of rhetoric. Obviously, rhese eighr concepts are not rhe on ly starting points. 
Thus, my study invites interesred scholars to expand my extrapolarions and also construct 
orher feminist rheories of rheroric. 
This exrrapolarion process has important implications. First, ir challenges rhe received 
rhetorical u aditions not in arder ro erase tradicional rheories no r si mply ro add women's 
voices ro rhem but rather ro rethink our discipline; rhar is, chis process forces us ro ask what 
happens if we imagine rherorical hisrory as a map wirh Arisrode's rheory clearly marked 
and Woolf's, Rich 's, and Daly's theories newly chaned. Second, ir asks how rheroric and 
composition srudies may be informed nor jusr by rhe presence of Woman and women but 
by feminist ideology. Third, ir explores how rhecoric and composition srudies, specifically 
che quescion of Bachsheba's dilemma, may be informed by lirerary srudies, religious studies, 
and women's studies. And, fourrh, it also raises cerrain quesrions. Such quesrions will mosr 
likely emerge from che following three grounds, and alrhough 1 will attempr ro anticipare 
such queries, my responses will, 1 hope, evoke even more quesrions. 
The firsr query is ofren consrrucced as follows: would srudying Woolf, Daly, and Rich 
in rhetoric and composition srudies be appropriate, given rhat chese feminists do nor locate 
rhemselves within rhetorical tradirions and g iven thar tradicional histories of rheroric do 
not commonly claim che cexcs of rhese feminisrs? My response is simple. Borh claims are 
rrue. But if someone employs rhese rwo claims to prevenr inrerdisciplinary moves, he/she 
is assuming rhar aurhorial intent determines meaning and rhar canon formarían is static. 
Moreover, rhese claims ignore Woolrs, Da ly's, and Rich's concerns wirh rherorical conceprs. 
Their schooling, talents, intereses, opportunities, polirics, and particular historical moments 
have led rhese feminisr acrivists ro become a novelist, a philosopher (one who studies "phi-
losophia"), ~nd a poet, respecrively. Their concerns abour women, language, and writing, 
however, can be (re)read as Anglo-American feminist rheories of rheroric thar challenge the 
genderblindness of more tradicional histories, rheories, and pedagogies. To emphasize how 
rhese feminists may be read as rhetorical rheorisrs, I have included a secrion in each sub-
sequent chapter rhat locaces rheir feminisc rexrs in relarion ro rhetorical rheories, lore, and 
practice. 
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The second query usually emerges as follows: would not focusing on French feminist 
theories be more appropriate, given thar they are more sophisticared than Anglo-American 
rheories? Wirhin rhe logic of rhis quesrion, Anglo-American feminist theories are deni-
grared as naive posturings of language use, autonomous wills, and identity politics; rhey 
are rhen compared ro French feminist theories, which are hailed as sophisticared critiques 
of language, subjecriviry, closure, writing, and so on. Ironically, chis binary reinforces rhe 
structure of phallogocentric logic, with French rheories occupying the dominant posirion 
and Anglo-American rheories occupying the subordinare one; chis binary also erases the 
presence of feminist rheories that fir into neither category. Within this denigration logic, 
Anglo-American feminisms are divided inro liberal a nd radical feminisms; in turn, radical 
femi nisms, with which Daly's and Rich 's texts are associared and for which Woolf's texts 
construcr a space, are frequently accused of essentialism33 and separatism.34 [ • • • ] 1 revise 
rhese prevai ling readings of Anglo-American feminisms; rhat is, 1 reread Woolf, Daly, and 
Rich ro refute claims rhat an essenrial female self ex ists, that gender identity and sexual 
orientation occur only as conscious choice, and that idenrification among women is only 
achieved by a Sarrrean bond ing as objects (Nye 104). 
The rhird query is perhaps the mosr serious: would a focus on Anglo-American feminist 
rheory preclude discussions of difference? If we assume that difference occurs only between 
categories of feminisms, then such a focus would preclude such discussions. But if we as-
sume that difference occurs not only berween categories but also within them, then my 
focus on Woolf, Oaly, and Rich may be read as exposing differences within Anglo-American 
feminisms . [ . .. ] Foregrounding differences within Anglo-American feminisms is a neces-
sary m ove if these theories are ro be particularized a nd recovered from charges of na'iveté. 
The purpose of such a move is ro celebrare Anglo-American radical feminist rheories as one 
of many kinds of feminisms. Yet the erhics of such a move enrails our continually asking 
ourselves, and addressing, che following questions: what can be accepted in these rheories, 
what must be discarded, and what needs ro be reconsrructed? Ir also entails asking and ad-
dressing: who is (not) speaking, who is (not) listening, and what is (not) being heard? Re-
sponses ro such queries should serve as rhe ímpetus for furure research. 
By studying Woolfs, Daly's, and Rich's Anglo-American feminist theories of rhetoric, 1 
hope ro invite new voices and new hearings into che history of rheroric. For by changing con-
texts and lines of argumenr, these rhreeAnglo-American feminists have reinforced, rejecred, 
or reimagined tradicional rheories of rhetoric, wherher consciously or unconsciously, ro chal-
lenge rhe dominanr ideology and push rheir own polirical goals.36 As challengers of phal-
logocenrric culture and its dominant discourse(s), rhese rhree writers a nd their texts have 
provided a means of recognizing, validaring, and addressing women's commonsense experi-
ences, otherwise known as Bathsheba's dilemma. In rhe process, these writers and their texts 
have construcred feminist literacies from which ro enacr changes in the interwoven realms 
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of the personal, the textual, a nd the cultura l. T hat, 1 wi ll a rgue, is rhe imporra nce of rheir 
Anglo-American femin isr rheories of rheroric for rheroric and composition srudies. 
NoTEs 
1 Women's specch has rradirionally been srcrcoryped as "polirc, emocional, enrhusiasric, gos-
sipy, ra lkarive, uncerrain, du ll, and charry" whilc men's speech has bcen described as "capable, d irecr, 
racional, illusrraring a sense ofhumor, unfceling, srrong (i n rone and word choice), and blunr" (Kra-
marae 58). Scholars in communicarion srudies (c.g., Karlyn Kohrs Campbdl, Thcodora Marrin) and 
sociolinguisric srudies (e.g., Robín Lakoff, Ca re Poynron, Julia Penelope, Dale S pender) have soughr ro 
disprove rhese srereorypes. [ ... ] 
2 M y use of rhe rerm symbolic derives from Krisreva's division of human experience inro rhc semi-
ocie and symbol ic realms (Rtvolution). Her rerms, in turn, echo Lacan's d ivision of human exisrence 
inro rhree orders: rhe rtal (rhe anaromical order rhar cannor be known, which exisrs before rhe ego and 
rhe formarion of rhe drives); rhe imaginary (rhe ordcr where a child rorally idenrifles wirh rhe world 
and cannot disringuish a space berwecn sclf and orhcrs, parricularly rhe Morher; Krisrcva renames rhis 
order rhe semioric); and rhe symbolic (rhe order of language and loss of idenriry in which rhe lack of 
rhe larrcr rriggcrs conrinual repressions of rhis lack and, hcnce, gives rise ro rhe unconscious and rhe 
powcr of rhe phallus). My subsequenr d iscussions of rhc symbolic also assume a fami liari1y wirh orher 
rerms in French discourse rheories: for exa mple, Ocrrida's fogocentrism , which privileges rhe Logos as 
a meraphysical presence; Lacan's pha//ocmtrism, which privileges rhe phallus as rhe source/posirion of 
power; and C ixous's combinarion of rhe rwo rerms inro phallogocmtrism (Moi 105). 
3 Cameron argues rhat debates abour Barhsheba's dilemma have acrually posirioned rhemsclves 
inro rwo widcly deftned moves: criricism and crit ique (Feminist Critiqut 2-3). The ft rst move assumes 
rhar ro change rhe world, wc musr change rhe world 's words: language use musr be revised if women 
are ro consrrucr a space in which ro express rhemselves. [ ... ) Cameron's second move, critique, assumes 
rhar ro change rhe world and Woman's/women's posirions wirhin ir, feminisrs musr rerhink Woman's/ 
women's relarion ro language and ro rhe dominanr discursive pracrices. Feminisrs musr "examine rhe 
condiribns u pon which [Barhsheba's d ilemma] exisrs, ca lling inro quesrion rhe assurnprions iris based 
on" (Feminist Critique 2). Such a philosophical critique would ca ll inro quesrion rhe rrurh condirions 
of cultural assumprions abour gendcr, class, sex roles, and so on, chus enabling feminisrs ro describe, 
demysrify, and revise rheir mulriple culrurallocarions. [ ... ) 
s [ . .. ] For fem inisr challenges ro hisrorical rradirions, see Lerner; Anderson and Zinsser; and Bri-
denrhal, Koonz, and Scuarr. For feminisr challenges ro philosophical rradirions, sce Nye; and Wairhe. 
Bizzcl l posirs a slighdy differenr research agenda for feminisr challenges ro rhe rherorical rradirions: 
(1 ) read tradicional rherorical rheories as a resisring readcr; (2) recovcr women who have wricren abour 
rhcroric; and (3) include women who have nor necessarily focused on rheroric buc whose work mighr 
reconcepruatize rherorical srudies (51). [ ... ] 
7 To avoid repearing rhe awkward phrase, "women and/or feminisrs," 1 wi ll simply use "fem inisr" 
because ir implies an ideological srance rhar borh includes women and challenges rhe dominanr logic 
and rheroric. [ . . . ] 
9 Alrhough rh is srudy foregrounds feminisr rheories of rheroric, orher srud ies mighr jusr as im-
porranrly focus on women's rheroric(s), rheories of womcn's rheroric(s), or women's dteories of rheroric. 
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They mighr examine feminine rheroric(s), rheories o f fcm inine rheroric(s), or feminine rheories of 
rheroric. T hcy mighr srudy feminisr rheroric(s) or evcn rhcories of feminisr rheroric(s). As becomes 
readily apparem, a wealrh of research possibilir ics emerges (Jarran, "Speciallssue"). [ ... ] 
12 When discussing cross-culrural rcscarch possibilirics, quesrions of appropriario n , colonizarion, 
and roken ism ofren emerge. For examplc, sce Lee; and huoks, TaLking Back. [ ... ] For an excellent 
explorarion of appropria rio n a nd race, see Anza ldúa. [ ... ] 
16 Lakoff sripulares ccrrain language funcrions rhat belong ro women and men and rhar resulr 
in " linguistic imbalances" (Language and Wonums Place 43; qrd. in Ryder 531): women, for example, 
have more na mes for colors rhan men; men, on rhe orher hand , use m ore expletivcs publicly. Cixous's 
medusa recovers rhe mons rcr/hys teric posirion for womcn, posiring ir as a position of strength . For 
Ryder, rhis binary traps women inro adopring social ro les rhar are rorally derermined by language (e.g., 
Lako ff) or having ro resorr ro madness (e.g .• C ixous). For an in-deprh discussion of chis binary, see 
Ryder 530-31. For a history of chis deba re, see A. O. H ill. [ ... ] 
19 This move presumes a definirion ofideology similar ro rhe one posired by C ixous and Clement: 
"Forme ideology is a kind of vasr membrane enveloping everything . We have ro know that this skin 
exisrs even ifir endoses us like a ner or like closed eyelids. We have ro know rhat, ro change the world , 
we mus r constamly rry ro scrarch and rear ir. We can never rip rhe whole rhing off, bur we must never 
ler ir srick or srop being suspicious of ir" (145). [ ... ] 
21 Naranson posirs a mulrilayered , progressively abstraer definition when he argues t hat rheroric 
may refer ro all of rhe following: (J) rherorical inremion in speech o r writing, (2) the rechnique of 
persuasion, o r merhodology, (3) rhe general rariona le of pcrsuasion, or rheory, and (4) rhe philosophy 
of rheroric, or rhe crit ique of rheo ry (379). Bizzell and Herzberg follow su ir, siruaring rheroric as "rhe 
pracrice of oraror; rhe srudy of che srraregies of effecrivc orarory; che srudy of rhe persuasive effecrs 
of language; rhe srudy of rhe relarion berween language and knowledge; the classification and use of 
rropes; and, of course, rhe use of empry promiscs and half-rrurhs as a form of propaganda" (l). 
22 Arisrotle's Prior AnaLytics posirs rhrec types of syllogisms: scienrific, dialecric, and rhetorical 
(rhe enrhymeme). The flrsr assumes rrue premises and conclusions; rhe second assumes probable prem-
ises and rrue conclusions; rhe rhird assumes probable premises and conclusions. His Rhetoric discusses 
rhe enrhymeme and cites rwo rypes-rhe demonsrrarive enrhymeme, which proves a proposirion, and 
rhe refurarive enthymeme, which d i5proves onc (bk. 2, ch. 22); he a lso cites rhe four rypes of faces 
u pon which an enrhymeme m ay be based-probabilities, cxamples, infallible signs, fallible signs (bk. 
2, ch. 25). 
23 Sce, for examplc, Deurero nomy 17:6 and Numbers 30:35. Borh cirarions refer speciflcally ro 
rhe dearh penalty. But rhe importance of witncsses (read "mcn") is srressed rhroughout Exodus, Leviti-
cus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy. [ ... ] 
24 1 nterrogacions of presence ha ve arrempred ro erase traces of aurhorial agency in rhe making of 
meaning and, insread , have fo rcgroundcd rhc funcrions of readers, instituc ional structures, and lan-
guage. Sec Barrhes, "Dearh of rhe Aurhor»; Foucaulr; and De;rida, "Srrucrure, Sign, and Play." 
2~ Parrly beca use of rhe ritle of his a rricle "The Dearh of rhe Aurhor," Barrhes is often misread as 
eliminaring any rype of agcncy. Because he asserrs rhar rhc dearh of rhc aurhor allows the birrh of rhe 
read er, a rype of readerly agency emerges. While rhe wrirer is a read er o f the world, s he or he cannor 
conrrol rhe m eanings in rhc texrs rhar are consrrucred for orher readers. [ ... ] 
33 Nye derails rhe arrack againsr perceived cssential ism in Anglo -American radical feminisms: 
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Radical feminisrs, having rheorized a world of warring wills, cannor so easily escape their 
own rheory .... 
. . . Early radical femin isrs caralogued in derail the socializarion of women, bur social-
izarion d id nor excuse women's capitularion. Socializarion implies an inracr female self which 
may be influenced bur which can a lso refuse ro accepr rhe rewards of collaborarion and cou-
rageously accepr rhe pain of non-conformiry. Gender idenriry and rhe choice of sexual object, 
however, may not be accessible ro conscious change .... 
Nor is there any posirive prognosis in radical feminisr rheory for a woman's refusal ro be 
a fellow rraveller . . .. In each case, feminisr rheory and pracrice conrinues ro operare wirhin 
rhe space of Sarrean meraphysics ... [rhar] is inadequare ro feminisr pracrice. (1 02) [ ... ] 
3-4 The perceived male/female separarism is mosr frequenrly associared with Rich 's and Daly's 
rexrs. While rheir scpararisr momenrs cannor be denied, suc h a m ale-cenrered gaze roo easily dismisses 
rhe importance of rhese feminisr rheories a nd erases rhe facr rhar a woman's wanring ro focus on 
women and fighr parriarchy is nor synonymous wirh androcide. [ . .. ] 
36 In rhis sensc, ideology becomes mo re rhan a ser of doctrines. Ir becomes "rhe ways in which 
whar we say and believe connecrs wirh rhe power-srrucrure and power-relarions of che sociery we live 
in .. . rhe modes of feeling, valuing, perceiving, and belicving which have sorne kind of rclarion ro rhe 
mainrenance and reproducrion of social power" (T. Eagleron 14-15). This definirio n may be expanded 
for feminism by asserting rhar "[o]nly a concepr of ideology as a conrradicrory consrrucr, marked by 
gaps, slides, and inconsisrencies, wou ld enable feminism co explain how even rhe severesr ideological 
pressures will generare rheir own lacunae" (Moi 26). Within this rheory of ideology, che cultural and 
che textual are inrerwoven. For ideological beliefs are nor only manifesred in (un)srared cultural be-
haviors bur are also "translared inro lirera ry forms and convcnrions rhar ar once encocle and perpetuare 
rhose values" (Boorie). [ ... ] 
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